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A REVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER LucAs
JAMES W. SANDERSON AND ANN MESMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent opinion on regulatory takings, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Comm 'n, I is the latest high court guidance address-
ing the tension between rights of property owners and what some see as
broader societal goals of either protecting or providing public access to
areas of environmental, and therefore, public value. Many believe that
the Lucas decision reflects the broader goals of the Reagan-Bush era.
2 It
shifts the analytical focus in environmental takings jurisprudence to a
more owner-oriented analysis, in line with the general perception that
the high court is weighted with "pro-property" justices.
3
With the election of President Clinton, one question is whether ef-
forts to advance the Clinton/Gore environmental agenda will receive a
hostile welcome among the judiciary. 4 A related question is whether
property owners will be compensated for losses suffered in the name of
"public interest." This article reviews developments in federal takings
jurisprudence. It first briefly reviews the historical development of regu-
latory takings jurisprudence and current practice, then discusses in de-
tail the Court's more recent Lucas analysis and issues that remain
unresolved.
* Mr. Sanderson is a Shareholder and Director, Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson,
P.C.; A.B., University of Nebraska, 1966; J.D., University of Denver, 1969. Ms. Mesmer
clerked for Chief Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, U.S. District Court, District of Colorado,
and she practiced law for just over two years with Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C.;
B.A., Williams College; J.D., Boston University, 1989.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Several initial commentaries cast Lucas as a win for private property owners. See,
e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Supports Rights of Landowners, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1992,
at A3; Comnrentary: No More 'Takings,' Please, ROCKY MouNrAIN NEWS, July 2, 1992, at 70;
Elliott, Property Rights Ruling Recasts Land-Use Law, THE DENVER POST, July 18, 1992.
3. Five of nine justices are Reagan-Bush appointees: O'Connor, Souter, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas. Justice Rehnquist was appointed ChiefJustice during this period. Jus-
tices White (who announced his retirement from the bench as this Article went to press),
Blackmun and Stevens round out the lot. Over 70% of the current active circuit court
judges have been appointed since 1980, when the Republicans took office. An even higher
percentage of the active district court judges, over 757, have taken the bench during this
time. WEST'S POCKET DIARY, FEDERALJUDGES EDITION, 1993 at 5-24, 97-111 (1992).
4. The Clinton/Gore plan adopts five major goals: (1) reduce pollution and solid
waste; (2) preserve America's natural beauty and key resources; (3) use market forces to
encourage environmental protection; (4) exert American leadership for a healthier world;
and (5) improve energy efficiency. Contained within these general goals are specific goals,
such as reform and proper enforcement of the EPA Superfund, support legislation al-
lowing ordinary citizens to sue federal agencies, make the "no net loss" wetlands pledge a
reality, and "crack down" on environmental crime. Clinton/Gore '92 Committee. Clinton/
Gore on Protecting Our Environment (1992).
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II. REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Brief Discussion of the Evolution of Regulatory Takings
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
5
It is settled law that the Fifth Amendment also protects the property of
states and local units of government under this principle. 6 "Regulatory
takings" under the Fifth Amendment evolved from traditional condem-
nation law, under which the government directly appropriates private
property for such public uses as parks, streets and walkways. 7 The con-
cept of physical appropriation now extends beyond actual entry onto
and possession of property to include acts that invade less directly one's
private use and enjoyment of property. 8 As the concept of compensable
physical invasion grew to include invasions other than actual entry onto
property, the notion that regulations could indirectly preclude one's use
and enjoyment of property took root.9 Thus, regulatory takings result
from regulation that interferes with a property owner's economic inter-
ests to such a degree that, even without physical entry, the property is
essentially "appropriated" for governmental use and the owner de-
serves compensation.' 0
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment was intended not to preclude taking of
private property for public purposes, but to secure compensation in such event. First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946) ("[W]hen the Federal
Government... takes for a federal public use the independently held and controlled prop-
erty of a state or of a local subdivision, the Federal Government recognizes its obligation
to pay just compensation for it..."); California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 263-64 (9th
Cir. 1968) ("[Tlhe Fifth Amendment protects the property of the State from appropriation
by the United States without 'just compensation.' This is true even when the property has
been dedicated by the State to public use.").
7. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (condemnation of land for redevel-
opment pursuant to District of Columbia Redevelopment Act).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government planes flying
low over a chicken farm constituted a compensable physical invasion that prevented the
owner from operating a successful chicken farming business); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-
Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986)
(homeowners allowed to sue municipality for taking resulting from noise and vibrations
caused by aircraft).
9. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding min-
ing of subsurface coal constituted taking of coal); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986 (1984) (interest in environmental data recognized as a trade secret under state law and
thus was a property interest for takings purposes). But see Calvert Invest. Inc. v. Louisville
Metro. Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988) (no property interest in expectation to
continue delivering sewage treatment services); United States v. Charles George Trucking
Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988) (entry onto property for CERCLA clean-up pur-
poses is not a taking); Cecos Int'l Inc. v.Jorling, 706 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. N.Y. 1989), aft'd,
895 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1990) (company's expectation that permit procedures will not change
is not a protected property interest for takings purposes); Environmental Waste Control,
Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga.
1991) (damage to business reputation from preliminary assessment under CERCLA not a
protected property interest); Lachney v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 244 (1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d
158 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (two year delay in granting permit pursuant to Clean Water Act § 404
did not constitute a taking).
10. The analysis to determine whether compensation is deserving, however, is differ-
ent for each type of taking. Physical appropriations have, at least since Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), required no consideration of
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B. Court Proceedings in a Takings Case
Controversies involving potential takings are unique in that prop-
erty owners' various remedies are not necessarily pursued in one case.
For example, permit denial or a zoning action may be challenged under
applicable substantive criteria (i.e., statutory or regulatory law) before
an administrative law judge. This is distinguished from rights the prop-
erty owner may have under the Fifth Amendment. When confronted
with a permit denial, an owner who believes that his property has been
"taken" can pursue his substantive case before an administrative law
judge and can also-pursue compensation for a taking in claims court. "
An owner can pursue equitable relief in claims court, but courts
favor using claims court for money damages only. 12 This rule relates
directly to the maxim that the necessity of compensation does not result
from unlawful government actions, but instead from lawful exercises of
regulatory powers that do not include compensation for losses.' 3
Takings claims for monetary relief proceed under the Tucker Act in
claims court.14 The general policy has been stated by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc. :15
We have held that, in general, "[e]quitable relief is not avail-
able to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can
be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking. Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Company, 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) [citation
omitted].
The United States Claims Court has jurisdiction "to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Con-
stitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive de-
partment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort." 16 However,
whether the government legitimately has regulated. Compensation is instead deserving
upon a determination that a physical appropriation has occurred. Regulatory takings de-
terminations take account not only of whether legitimate governmental action might pre-
clude recovery, but also of the remaining value of property after governmental action.
These are essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, and do not always result in a compensable
taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, (1978).
11. With limited exceptions, the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction
for claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
12. The claims court may grant declaratory judgements and grant equitable relief (in-
cluding injunctions) within its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) and (3) (1982). How-
ever, the Supreme Court indicated in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990), that Takings
Clause cases should be pursued in claims court as suits for compensation.
13. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 at n.22
(1987) (illegal actions or public nuisances are not compensable).
14. 28 U.SC. § 1491(a)(1)(1988); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (takings chal-
lenge to conversion of public lands easement from railroad to public trail without permis-
sion was premature when not brought in claims court first).
15. 474 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1985) (facial challenge to permit requirements of § 404 of
the Clean Water Act as regulatory taking premature.).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (1988).
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[Tihe United States Claims Court shall not have jurisdiction of
any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee
has pending in any other court any suit or process against the
United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect
thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under
the authority of the United States.'
7
The statute of limitations for actions over which the claims court
has jurisdiction is six years.' 8 With limited exceptions, the federal dis-
trict courts have concurrent jurisdiction for claims against the United
States not exceeding $10,000.19 Claims court judges can sit anywhere
within the United States to take evidence and enter judgment. 20 Parties
can appeal claims court decisions to the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims court cases.
2 1
III. THE LAW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS PRIOR TO AND AFTER LucAs
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Lucas in late June, 1992.
The decision, one of two takings cases decided by the Court,2 2 marked a
turning point in takings analysis.
A. Prior to Lucas-Balancing of Governmental Interests against Owner's
Interests
The test for determining whether government action amounts to a
regulatory taking has appeared in two related forms since 1980. Each
test basically requires balancing legitimate governmental interests
against a property owner's right to compensation for the resulting re-
duction in the property's value.
2 3
The Agins two-part test was announced in 1980.24 Under the Agins
test, one can recover compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
where: (1) government action fails to substantially advance a legitimate
governmental interest; or (2) government action effectively deprives the
17. Id. § 1500.
18. Id. § 2501. See also DiPerri v. Federal Aviation Admin., 17 ERC 1792 (D. Mass.
1981) (action for uncompensated taking for noise associated with Logan Airport accrued
at least 15 years earlier and was barred by six-year statute of limitations).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). See also United States v. Mt. Vernon Memorial Estates,
Inc., 17 ERC 2212 (N.D. 11. 1981) (district court did not have jurisdiction to hear eight
million dollar counterclaim by landowners for taking resulting from denial of permit to
construct sanitary landfill).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2505 (1988).
21. Id. § 1295(a)(3).
22. The other case that the court decided was Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522 (1992), concerning whether a rent control ordinance amounted to a taking.
23. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60 (1964); Richard
A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For a
recent review of takings analysis as it relates to selected environmental matters prior to
Lucas, see James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and other Critters - Is
it Against Nature to Payfor a Taking? 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992).
24. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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owner's property of all economic value.2 5 In Agins, plaintiff developers
sought compensation for a taking of a five-acre tract because the City of
Tiburon restricted development of that tract to five or fewer single-fam-
ily homes. 26 Plaintiffs had planned to build multi-family dwellings on
the property.2 7 The Supreme Court ruled that the restriction did not
amount to a taking. 28 The Court's discussion focussed on the City's le-
gitimate exercise of a governmental interest and less on determining the
tract's residual value. 29 In fact, the Court went so far as to speculate
that the owner might actually benefit from leaving the tract undevel-
oped, and that such a benefit could offset any losses.30
The Court also used the Agins test to decide Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n. 31 In Nollan, a state agency conditioned a private prop-
erty owner's building permit on securing a right-of-way across the
owner's land.3 2 The easement supposedly improved public access to
the beach.33 The Nollan Court refined the "legitimate state interests"
test, requiring a substantial "nexus" between the exercise of govern-
mental authority and the purpose to be achieved. 34 The Supreme Court
saw through the defendant's veiled purpose of preserving public access
to a beach by requiring plaintiff to grant a right-of-way across its prop-
erty when constructing their home. The Court stated that beach access
might be a laudable purpose, but a single property owner cannot be
required to relinquish a major property interest (i.e., the right to ex-
clude others) to promote that purpose without being compensated for a
taking.3 5 The Court ruled that a taking had occurred because the law
did not effectively advance a legitimate state interest.
36
In other cases, however, the Court has employed a three-prong test
that balances various factors related to the Agins test. 3 7 Three factors
that have particular significance in this regard are: (1) the character of
government action; (2) the economic impact of government action; and
25. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. See also United States v. Riverside-Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985) (although test not applied, Court reiterates applicability of Agins test).
26. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
27. Id. at 258.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 260-61.
30. Id. at 262.
31. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
32. Id. at 827.
33. Id. at 828.
34. Id. at 837.
35. Id. at 841. The Supreme Court has not elaborated an exact standard for deter-
mining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest." Federal courts have seldom found
that a taking occurs solely because a legitimate governmental interest is not substantially
advanced, but rather have found it necessary in every case to include at least a nominal
discussion of economically viable use of the property at issue. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sports-
man's League v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'dinpart rev'dinpart, 715
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (state has legitimate interest in regulating wetlands under § 404
of Clean Water Act).
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
37. This test existed prior to Agins. The two tests relate in that Agins essentially re-
states the three-prong test as a general, two-part balancing test. Until Lucas, the tests have
survived as independent analyses.
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(3) the extent to which government action interferes with distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations.3 8 Although the Agins test has survived,
recent courts have used this three-prong test to analyze takings issues.3 9
The Court seemingly employs the three-prong test to focus more di-
rectly on matters from an owner's perspective. Accordingly, a taking
occurs if the injury to the property is sufficiently severe, even though the
government might have a legitimate interest in regulating.
For example, in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,40 the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that the "holding or plain implication of Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.4 1 ... is that a regulation can be a taking if its effect
on a landowner's ability to put his property to productive use is suffi-
ciently severe."'4 2 In Florida Rock, the plaintiff was a limestone miner
who was denied a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act to
mine ninety-eight acres of a 1,560 acre tract.4 3 In its analysis, the court
recognized that Clean Water Act regulations substantially advance the
public welfare. 44 However, the court downplayed the environmental
degradation or "pollution" that the regulations prevented. In balancing
public against private interests, the court in Florida Rock concluded that
this was a situation where a private interest deserved compensation for
38. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (citing
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
39. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (statute precluding
recovery of costs spent on defunct nuclear power plant did not interfere with utility's over-
all investment-backed interests); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DiBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987) (no taking of subsurface coal where state has legitimate purpose for regu-
lating and coal's value not diminished). Other cases not discussed here also use the three-
prong test, including: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (chemical com-
pany on notice of conditions in which EPA can release information relating to registration
of chemicals under FIFRA and had no reasonable investment-backed expectation that in-
formation would be protected); Price v. City of Junction, 711 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1983)
(ordinance allowing city to order removal ofjunked vehicles from property does not deny
landowner of economically viable uses of land); Atlas Corp v. United States, 895 F.2d 745
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990) (UMCTRA regulations requiring company to
stabilize mill uranium tailings piles did not interfere with investment-backed interests);
Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (governmental designation of river
area for protection under National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act may have deprived land
owners of economically viable use of mining claim); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
310 (1991) (denial of permit to fill New Jersey wetlands did not deprive owners of all
economically viable use of property, owners had unreasonable expectation that property
could be developed profitably; mixture of Agins and three-part test); Dufau v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (mixture of Agins and three-part test; sixteen-month delay in
issuing permit did not constitute a temporary taking because it did not deprive owners of
enough economically viable use of property); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct.
Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (denial of permits to construct near navigable waters
of the United States did not render property valueless); Deltona Corp v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denial of § 404 of Clean Water
Act permit did not render property valueless); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd.,
485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984) (owners could not reasonably expect to develop property con-
taining wetlands and thus no taking occurred).
40. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
41. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). The Riverside case criticized the lower court's narrow con-
struction of § 404 regulations of the Clean Water Act to avoid compensation. Id. at 127.
42. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 900.
43. Id. at 895-96.
44. Id. at 898.
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loss incurred, aside from the threat that regulation prevented. 45
B. Lucas Clarifies the Test for Determining Whether Government Action
Amounts to a Regulatory Taking
The Court's decision in Lucas comes full circle in a sense. It inte-
grates the current emphasis on economic impacts highlighted by the
three-prong test into the Agins test, to provide clarity for future takings
cases. In Lucas, plaintiff Lucas sued because legislation amending the
South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,46 passed subse-
quent to his acquisition of beachfront property, prevented him from de-
veloping two lots situated along the South Carolina coast.4 7 The case
made its way through the South Carolina courts until the state supreme
court ruled that the legislation prevented harmful and noxious public
nuisances and therefore fell within the traditional "nuisance" exception
to a taking.
4 8
Although the facts of the case center around the nuisance excep-
tion, the Supreme Court takes the opportunity to clarify the takings test.
The Court first re-enunciates the Agins two-part standard as its test, this
time placing emphasis on the second prong, denial of all economically
beneficial use.4 9 The Court reasons that the "deprivation of all econom-
ically viable use" test gives merit to the common law "equities" ap-
proach which holds that it is fair to compensate someone who has lost all
property value, regardless of whether the government action is justi-
fied.5 0 To bolster this equitable emphasis, the Court justifies its rule by
using an historical perspective. 5 1 Having taken an historical perspec-
tive, the Court delivers an implicit message: because traditional con-
demnation law centered around an owner's loss of property, the law of
regulatory takings analysis should square with its historical origins.
5 2
The Court thus abandons any sort of balancing test and establishes the
important initial consideration for future courts-reduction in property
value. Whether a regulation advances legitimate governmental interests
is secondary to this analysis.
53
45. Id. at 905-06. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153
(1990) (property owner compensated for denial of § 404 permit under the Clean Water
Act).
46. S.C. Code Ann. § 48 (Law Co-Op. 1976 & Supp. 1992).
47. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90. Lucas is related directly to two other consolidated
cases decided pursuant to the same statute in South Carolina. Both cases were not takings
where beachfront houses once existed, were destroyed by weather, and could not be re-
built because of statutory prohibitions. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
48. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886.
49. Id. at 2893-95.
50. Id. at 2894.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2893.
53. Id. The Court's clarification, however, is not entirely pro-property. The Court
emphasized that it will not compensate for less than "total" reductions in value. Id. at
2895.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
C. Lucas did not Decide all Questions Related to Residual Value after
Government Action, but does Offer New Guidance
The trial court in Lucas determined that the South Carolina statute
had reduced Mr. Lucas' property value to nothing. 54 Therefore, the
Court does not address directly the considerations involved in establish-
ing a total deprivation of property value. Some of these considerations
are: (1) What percentage of the property's value must be lost to amount
to a "total deprivation?" (2) What types of remaining uses for the prop-
erty are considered in determining its residual value? (3) How does the
Court consider smaller parcels that are part of larger parcels? Although
these questions are not addressed directly, the Court drops some rather
strong hints for future cases.
1. What Percentage of the Property's Value must be Lost to
Amount to a "Total Deprivation?"
No question now exists that an owner whose property contains no
residual value should be compensated. 55 Can this be expressed in per-
centages? In short, probably. The Court speaks to this issue in footnote
eight of its majority opinion, responding to Justice Stevens' dissent.
56
In his dissent,Justice Stevens argues that the majority's opinion is unfair
in that someone who loses ninety-five percent of his property's value will
not be compensated, while someone who loses just five percent more, or
one hundred percent of his property, will be compensated. 57 But the
majority refuses to apply percentages to the loss in value, 58 instead re-
ferring to other inquiries such as "the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations." '5 9 In this way, the Court
shows its preference for a non-numerical analysis that could result in a
taking regardless of the percentage of property deprived of value.
2. What Types of Remaining Uses for the Property are
Considered in Determining its Residual Value?
Most property can be used for some purpose, even though it might
not be developed. For example, a piece of beachfront property might
provide both a scenic spot for tourists and wildlife habitat. These types
of uses, however, provide little or no income to the developer, whose
plans generally include maximizing income by providing exclusive use
54. Id. at 2896.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2895.
57. Id.
58. This approach has been taken by the lower courts. See, e.g., Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile
County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (92% reduction in land value resulting
from denial of landfill permit for company operating 14 years not enough to constitute a
taking).
59. Lucas, 112 S. Ct at 2895 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Note that these
inquiries are part of the three-prong test, further indication that the Court is trying to
integrate the two tests.
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to the owner. Should this make a difference in takings cases? 60 The
Court's discussion of whether significant residual value remains in non-
income producing property again appears in footnote eight.6 1 The ma-
jority acknowledges to Justice Stevens that it might consider other types
of deprivations as takings, such as interests in excluding strangers from
one's land. The majority, however, dodges Justice Stevens' real criti-
cism, that "developmental" uses should not be the only uses the court
should consider when determining whether property has any remaining
value. If no developmental uses remain, the property still might have
enough value remaining to avoid a taking.
62
The majority indicates that deprivation of all developmental uses
seems to be enough for the Court to require compensation. 6 3 The
Court repeatedly equates deprivation of all property uses with "produc-
tivity" in its traditional sense, and refers indirectly to several environ-
mental uses as "unproductive" and "idle" uses of property.4 Two
references to the Court's discussion of the takings test illustrate the
point:
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a
compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that
leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or pro-
ductive options for its use--typically, as here, by requiring land to be
left substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm. [emphasis added].
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our fre-
quently expressed belief that when the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all [emphasis in original] eco-
nomically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that
is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
6 5
[emphasis added].
In addition, the Court compares regulatory takings to statutes that
impose servitudes on private scenic lands. Such statutes "suggest the
practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and appropri-
ation." 6 6 The Court's negative reference to wildlife refuges, scenic
easements and other protective easements for historic architectural,
archeological, or cultural purposes implies that such laws might amount
to compensable takings in the future.
6 7
60. This controversy has been brewing in the lower courts. In Florida Rock, for exam-
ple, the trial court refused to consider the value of the property to the government as a
measure of residual value in a property, and instead referred to the lack of business inter-
est in the property to prove that the property had no residual value after government
action. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161, 171-74 (1990).
61. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2899.
64. Id. at 2894-95.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2895.
67. Id.
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3. How does the Court Consider "Partial" Takings, i.e., Smaller
Parcels that are Part of Larger Parcels?
Although the Lucas case clearly decides that deprivation of all eco-
nomically beneficial use is reason in itself to compensate an owner for a
taking, the case does not address the issue of partial takings, which is
fundamental to determining economic deprivation. 68 "Partial takings"
result when a court considers denial of a permit for development of only
a portion of an owner's larger holdings.
6 9
For example, assume that Development, Inc. owns a 100 acre par-
cel. Owners like Development, Inc. commonly buy large parcels and de-
velop only a section at a time. In this case, Development, Inc. decides to
develop twenty of the 100 acres. The government, however, determines
that it will deny necessary approval to develop the twenty acres because
all of the subparcel contains wetlands. 70 Thus, the twenty acre portion
of Development, Inc.'s 100 acre parcel is rendered idle and Develop-
ment, Inc.'s investment is for naught.
Will the Court require the government to compensate Develop-
ment, Inc. for the lost investment in that twenty acres, or will the Court
look at the entire holdings of Development, Inc. adjacent to and sur-
rounding the twenty acres, and determine that no compensation is nec-
essary, because only twenty percent of the entire parcel is reduced in
value? The question arises because the Court has used both approaches
in nearly identical cases. 7 l Indeed, the Court openly acknowledges that
the issue exists and must be resolved in a future case.
7 2
A close reading of Lucas indicates that partial takings similar to the
above scenario will likely be compensated. Indeed, compensating par-
tial takings follows logically from the Court's justification that regulatory
takings resemble physical invasions, or appropriations. 73 Physical inva-
68. As the Court stated in footnote seven, the new rule emphasizing total deprivations
of property value has more rhetorical than real force until the issue of whether to compen-
sate partial takings is settled. Id. at 2894. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1190-93 (1967).
69. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886. The Court passed on an opportunity after Lucas to decide
the partial takings issue (also referred to as the "parcel as a whole" question) when it
refused to review Tull v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). See also Wetlands: High Court Foregoes
Opportunity to Define 'Parcel as a Whole'for Compensable Takings, 23 Env't Rep. Current Dev.
1551 (1992).
70. Several cases have addressed takings as a result of denial of a § 404 permit. See
generally Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990); Ciampitti v. United States, 18 Cl.
Ct. 548, 550 (1989).
71. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (law restrict-
ing subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987) (nearly identical law held not to effect
a taking). 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
72. Perhaps as a way to forecast how the Court will resolve the tension between the
two holdings, the Court refers to "the State's law of property - i.e., whether and to what
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular in-
terest in land with respect to which the takings claim alleges an diminution in (or elimina-
tion of) value." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
73. Id. at 2894.
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sions are compensated even though a potentially small part of one's
property might be taken. 74 Thus, partial takings should be compen-
sated no matter how small.
The view that partial takings should be compensated finds much
support in the Court's discussion. The Court repeatedly compares reg-
ulatory deprivations to physical appropriations that are compensated re-
gardless of the government's interest in regulating.7 5 For example,
eminent domain statutes creating scenic easements are similar to regula-
tory takings. 76 Such statutes often impinge on only a portion of an
owner's property.
More generally, the Court warns against government's ability to
press private property into some form of public purpose under the guise
of mitigating serious harm. 77 The Court views restrictive regulations
almost as a legislative evil, stating that the economically beneficial use
test should not succumb to "our usual assumption that the legislature is
simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.' ,,78 In ad-
dition, although total deprivations of beneficial use will be relatively
rare, 79 the Court spends much more discussion justifying that total dep-
rivations are compensable when they happen.
In other comments, the Court emphasizes repeatedly that good rea-
sons exist for its frequently expressed belief that owners who sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good must be
compensated.8 0 Finally, probably the most revealing hint is the Court's
criticism of its holding in Penn Central in footnote seven.8 ' In Penn Cen-
tral, the Court refused to compensate a property owner for a regulatory
taking, because regulation deprived him of only a portion of his prop-
erty. The Court reveals in Lucas that the Penn Central holding is now
"extreme and unsupportable."'8 2
D. Lucas Limits the Scope of the Nuisance Exception Depending on State Law
A long line of cases establish that "harmful or noxious uses" of
property can be proscribed without compensation.8 3 This exception is
74. Id. at 2893. The most recent case on point is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (plaintiff suffered a taking through physical invasion of
only 1 1/2 cubic feet of a building for cable TV lines).
75. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
76. Id. at 2895.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2894.
79. Id. at 2894.
80. Id. at 2895.
81. "For an extreme -and, we think, unsupportable-view of the relevant calculus,
see Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (1977), aff'd,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the state court examined the diminution in a particular par-
cel's value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of the total value of the taking
claimant's other holdings in the vicinity. Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2897. Several cases were cited in Lucas for this proposition. Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadachek
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commonly called -the "nuisance" exception to a taking, although the Lu-
cas Court is careful to characterize the exception as potentially broader,
falling within the state's general police powers. 84 The nuisance excep-
tion is not subject to takings analysis. Instead, the exception falls
outside the parameters of consideration indicating whether a taking has
occurred.
The Lucas Court rejects the nuisance exception to the extent that
the "legitimate state interest" test restates the same concern. To the
extent that a statute contains no direct, specific and clearly stated link to
the common law of nuisance in that state, it is not a nuisance exception
to a taking. 85 In such case, laws should be analyzed as part of a takings
analysis, and should be considered under the "legitimate state interests"
test. This change is bound to diminish the number of cases that are
subject to the nuisance exception and therefore will increase the chances
that exercise of regulatory powers amounts to a taking.
8 6
In response to Lucas, legislatures would be well-advised to re-ex-
amine state land use restrictions, and amend laws to either strengthen
their connection with common law nuisance principles or otherwise
amend laws to avoid unconstitutional takings if connections with com-
mon law do not exist. Mere recitations of general purposes won't pro-
tect state governments.
8 7
E. Lucas does not Address the Practical Issue of Quantifying Damages
The Court in Lucas did not address how to value the property that
Mr. Lucas lost. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the South Car-
olina court for further proceedings. 8 8 To date, the lower courts have
used several methods to value land. One might extrapolate those ap-
proaches to apply to other property such as water. Practically speaking,
determining the amount of reduction in value is difficult and can easily
dissolve into a "battle of the experts."
1. Options for Valuing Land
A review of three recent claims court cases in which damages were
awarded for reduction of property value upon denial of a Section 404
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in residential area);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent
infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effec-
tively preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area).
84. Lucas, at 2897.
85. Id. at 2900-01. The Lucas Court states that all legislation must identify common
law principles and show their relationship to the current restriction, i.e., the Court will not
"fill in the blanks" for state legislatures.
86. There exists little means of predicting the number of cases that will now result in
compensation to owners because of this shift. No doubt the initial barrier of the nuisance
exception will be easier to overcome for a time. In cases where a taking has clearly oc-
curred but for this exception, chances are greater that owners will now be compensated.
87. Ironically, even though the Court criticizes the "artfulness" of legislative drafting,
it has seemingly established a future of artful drafting in state legislatures.
88. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902.
[Vol. 70:3
TAKINGS AFTER LUCAS
permit under the Clean Water Act illustrates the difficulty of valuing
property. Simply put, the court must determine the value of the prop-
erty prior to government action and subtract any remaining value after
government action from that amount. Applying this simple concept,
however, leads to various results. In both Florida Rock and Loveladies
Harbor,8 9 the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking
(also the fair market value of the property prior to government action)
was the value of damages. For example, in Florida Rock, the property
was valued at $10,500 per acre prior to government action and ninety-
eight acres were lost ($1,029,000 was awarded in damages). Although
both courts preferred to use a "comparable sales" figure in calculating
the fair market value of property prior to government action, they dis-
agreed on how to calculate that figure. "Comparable sales" are used
often in real estate valuations. One looks for sales of comparable prop-
erty under comparable conditions to determine market value. In Florida
Rock, the trial court ultimately rejected a comparable sales analysis as
not comparable enough, and used a different calculation that was based
on acquisition cost, adjusted for the "changing value of money and real-
ity." In Loveladies Harbor, the court employed another variation on
"comparable sales," projecting the value of the property after develop-
ment, and then subtracting development costs from the final total. Fi-
nally, Formanek90 uses the Loveladies Harbor approach, but adjusts the
dollar values to reflect present values.
2. Options for Valuing Water
Comparable sales analysis is quite useful if one can find comparable
situations to use as a baseline in calculating value. Difficulty arises with
this approach, however, when property is more unique such as water
rights91 and mineral rights. 9 2 If at least three means of calculating com-
parable sales of land exist, imagine the difficulty in determining values
of these more obscure types of property.
If one applies the above approaches to valuing water several possi-
ble valuations can result. Using a water reservoir project as an example,
one might arrive at a "comparable" sales figure by determining the
value of water sold in another similar project. One might also reason-
ably determine the cost of the project after development and adjust that
89. In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), plaintiff was
denied a § 404 permit under the Clean Water Act to develop 11.5 acres of 51 acres re-
maining from a 250 acre tract in New Jersey.
90. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
91. For a more in-depth discussion of regulatory takings as they apply to water rights,
see David C. Hallford, Environmental Regulations as Water Rights Takings, NAT. RES. & ENVr.
13-15, 54-56 (Summer 1991).
92. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) for a recent discussion differentiating between land and mineral
rights. Other recent mineral rights cases which constitute takings include: NRG Co. v.
United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51 (1991) (cancellation of mineral prospecting permits on Indian
lands constituted taking); United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (expectation of mining lease approval is a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation).
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cost to today's dollars. The difficulty comes when determining the value
of water after government action. Water rights can be "changed"
through court proceedings and used for other purposes, but such a
change almost always diminishes the amount of the water right.9 3 In
addition, one cannot realistically determine the results of a change case
without actually going through the process. A change case could result
in a total loss of rights, or might diminish the right only marginally.9 4
Predicting a result is impossible.
III. CONCLUSION
During the Reagan-Bush era, the claims court was revived and sub-
sequent claims court decisions of Reagan-Bush appointees have
awarded high dollar amounts in damages for regulatory takings. 9 5 In
addition, the Supreme Court, now weighted heavily with Republican ap-
pointees, has established the claims court as the sole venue for takings
claims seeking compensation. Now that Lucas has been decided, the
claims court has a mandate to continue issuing decisions that take less
account of legitimate state interests in regulating and more account of a
loss in an owner's property value resulting from that regulation. Any
far-reaching environmental regulations enacted under President Clinton
could reach into the federal government's pocket as well. In the final
analysis, following Lucas, more owners will be compensated for regula-
tory takings.
93. See Hallford, supra note 92.
94. In Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1175-76, the court determined that the existence of
a statutory provision, 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5), that enabled the federal government to ex-
change coal that could not be developed for coal that could be developed, did not pre-
clude the court from finding that SMCRA provisions precluding surface mining of alluvial
valley floors constituted a taking.
95. Damages amounting to over a million dollars in each case were awarded in Florida
Rock and Loveladies Harbor. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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